Based on a unique dataset that identifies the locations of 19,832 financial analysts covering 21,885 firms from 49 countries during 1996-2013, we find that individualism of analysts' country of residence is negatively associated with their earnings forecast optimism and positively associated with their forecast accuracy. Using multiple proxies for economic incentives and cognitive biases, we find that individualism affects analyst forecast optimism and accuracy through the economic incentives that analysts face, rather than their cognitive biases (irrationality). Our results highlight the importance for regulators and investors to factor in culture values when battling against biased analyst research.
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Introduction
Previous studies relate international differences in analyst following and the properties of analyst forecasts to institutional characteristics such as legal origin, enforcement, corruption level, accounting choice, and disclosure of accounting policy. 1 We explore another potential source of international differences in analyst forecasting behavior: cultural values.
Hofstede and Bond (1988) Specifically, we focus on individualism/collectivism, one of the most important dimensions of cultural values, which measures the extent to which individuals value harmony within a group. 3 Individualism affects not only how members of society view their external relationships with others, but also their inner judgment, reasoning, and causal inference (Newman 1993 , Morris and Peng 1994 , Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan 1999 . These external 1 See for example Basu, Hwang and Jan (1998) , Chang, Khanna and Palepu (2000) , Hope (2003a) , Barniv, Myring and Thomas (2005) , Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) , Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) , Balboa, Gomez-Sala, and Lopez-Espinosa (2009), Chen, Ding, and Kim (2010) , Barniv, Hope, Myring, and Thomas (2010) , Tan, Wang, and Welker (2011), and Bilinski, Lyssimachou, and Walker (2013) . 2 See for example Griffin, Li, Yue, and Zhao (2009), Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) , Shao, Kwok, and Guedhami (2010) , Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo (2011), and Shao, Kwok, and Zhang (2013) . 3 Individualism-collectivism is the only dimension that appears in all five major frameworks on national cultures, including the Hofstede's model, the Kluckhohn and Strodbeck framekwork, the Schwartz Value Survey, Trompenaars's model of culture, and the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness project (Triandis 1995 , Thomas 2008 . This clearly shows individualism/collectivism as a cultural dimension with particular importance that surpasses other basic elements.
2 and internal effects provide a key link in the relationship between individualism and analyst forecast optimism and accuracy. We conjecture that individualism affects analyst forecast optimism and accuracy through two potential channels: economic incentives and cognitive biases, which correspond to the two main competing explanations offered in the analyst forecast literature. The first explanation attributes forecast optimism to economic incentives. Analysts are motivated to bias up their earnings forecast to generate investment bank business and brokerage commission fees for their firms. They may also provide biased research for favorable access to the management of covered firms. 4 The second explanation posits that analysts issue optimistic forecast as a result of their cognitive biases, or irrationality. 5 Distinguishing between these two hypotheses would make a significant contribution to the literature because the underlying causes of analyst bias have different policy implications.
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Using a unique dataset that identifies the location of 19,832 financial analysts covering 21,885 firms from 49 countries during 1996-2013, we find that individualism is negatively associated with analysts' earnings forecast optimism and positively associated with their forecast accuracy. When we add measures of economic incentives and cognitive biases and interact them with individualism, our results support that individualism affects analyst forecast optimism through economic incentives rather than cognitive biases. We also find that the culture difference 4 Dugar and Nathan (1995) , Lin and McNichols (1998) , Michaely and Womack (1999) , Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) , and Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2006) find that affiliated analysts working for investment-banking firms doing business with the covered firms provide more optimistic forecasts than unaffiliated analysts. Hong and Kubic (2003) show that for underwriter analysts, career promotion depends more on forecast optimism than on forecast accuracy. Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998) , Duru and Reeb (2002) , and Ke and Yu (2006) show that analysts issue optimistic forecasts to gain increased access to management for preferential information, especially for more opaque firms. 5 DeBondt and Thaler (1990) , Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) , Elgers and Lo (1994) , and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler, and Agarwal (2009) show that analysts systematically overreact to earnings information. 6 Few studies attempt to distinguish the effect of incentives from that of cognitive bias. Chen and Jiang (2006) offer indirect evidence that analysts' incentives play a larger role in misweighing than their behavioral biases. They find that analysts' deviation from efficient weighting of private information increases when the benefits from doing so are high or when the costs of doing so are low.
3 in individualism between analyst country and firm country is positively associated with forecast optimism and negatively associated with forecast accuracy. Our results are robust to alternative proxies for cultural values, different model specifications and sample selections.
We contribute to the analyst forecast literature by identifying a new factor that systematically affects analyst forecasting optimism and accuracy in the international setting.
Malloy (2005) finds differences in analyst forecast accuracy associated with geography.
Geography, however, may represent differences in a number of factors that potentially influence analyst behavior, such as geographic distance, legal environments, accounting regulations, and economic developments. Hope (2003b) provides evidence that countries' enforcement of accounting standards is positively associated with analyst forecast accuracy. Chen, Ding, and Kim (2010) find that analyst forecast accuracy is related to firms' political connections. These papers (including Malloy 2005) focus on the informational advantage of local analysts. We propose and find that a non-information-related variable, namely individualism, also causes differences in analysts forecast properties across countries. More importantly, due to his data constraint to U.S. companies covered by analysts located only in the U.S., Malloy (2005) does not relate analysts' culture orientation to their geographic locations, which is exactly what we do.
We find strong evidence that cultural values affect analyst forecast optimism and accuracy through economic incentives rather than cognitive biases (irrationality).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our main hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design, sample criteria and descriptive statistics.
Section 4 conducts empirical analyses on the determinants of analysts' forecast optimism and accuracy. Section 5 provides robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes. 4
Hypothesis development
Individualism-collectivism, one of the most important dimensions of cultural values, measures the extent to which individuals value harmony within a group. The core elements of individualism are independence and uniqueness while those of collectivism are duty to in-group and maintaining harmony (LeFebvre and Franke 2013). To the extent that these elements affect analysts' external relationships with others and their inner judgment, individualism may affect forecast optimism and accuracy through distinct channels. The determinants of analyst forecast bias largely fall into two categories: economic incentives and cognitive biases. 7 In this section, we draw on the extant incentive-and cognitive-based theories of analyst forecast behavior to develop hypotheses about the effect of individualism on forecast optimism and accuracy.
Individualism, economic incentives, and analyst forecasts
Individualism may affect analyst forecasts through the economic incentives that analysts face. Prior literature has identified three major economic incentives -generating investment banking business (Dugar and Nathan 1995, Lin and McNichols 1998) , increasing potential trading commissions (Irvine 2004 , Jackson 2005 , Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 2006 , and currying favor with management for access to information (Francis and Philbrick 1993 , Ke and Yu 2007 , and Libby, Hunton, Tan, and Seybert 2008 . Bond, Leung, and Wan (1982) and Earley (1994) argue that an individualistic culture is one where ties between people are loose, while a collectivistic culture is one where people are integrated into strong cohesive groups, so that they base their self-understanding on the reactions of others around them. Analysts in collectivistic culture therefore value group harmony more and view group membership as more long-term and permanent than do those in individualistic 7 See Kothari (2001) for a review of the evidence and explanations of analyst forecast optimism. 5 countries. Consequently, generating investment banking business and brokerage commission fees as a group undertaking are likely to be a more important concern for collectivistic analysts than for their individualistic counterparts. Furthermore, individualists are more oriented toward task achievement, sometimes at the expense of group relationships, whereas collectivists put more emphasis on developing and maintaining harmonious relationships, sometimes at the expense of task accomplishment (e.g., Triandis 1995, Chen, Chen, and Meindl 1998) . Keeping a good relationship with managers of covered firms are likely to be more important in collectivistic countries than in individualistic countries. Therefore, collectivist analysts are more likely to issue optimistic forecasts than individualist analysts do. From both aspects, we expect that analysts in individualist (collectivist) countries issue less (more) optimistic forecasts to generate investment banking business and brokerage commission fees and to please management of covered firms.
Correspondingly, forecasts by individualistic (collectivistic) analysts are more (less) accurate.
Based on the above arguments, we expect a negative relationship between individualism and optimism and a positive relationship between individualism and accuracy. If individualism affects forecast optimism through economic incentives, we expect the relationship between optimism and individualism to be stronger when analysts' conflicts of interests are more severe. 8 We acknowledge a tension to our theory that compensation structures in individualistic societies may reward individual performance more than those in collectivistic countries, thus motivating analysts in individualistic countries to issue more optimistic forecasts. This points out to a positive relationship between individualism and optimism which is contradictory to our expectation and not supported by our results. We thank an anonymous referee for this insight. We further address the concern about compensation structure in Section 5.1.
Hypothesis 2: The effect of individualism on forecast optimism (accuracy) is more
pronounced when economic incentives are stronger.
Individualism, cognitive biases, and analyst forecasts
A second school of theories on analyst forecast optimism posits that cognitive failures pervade to financial analysts whose judgment in turn deviates systematically from statistical rules, resulting in cognitive biases (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, DeBondt and Thaler 1990 Since culture differences between analyst countries and firm countries may make earnings more difficult to forecast, we expect forecast optimism to increase and forecast accuracy to decrease as the culture difference between analyst countries and firm countries increases. covering publicly traded companies located around the world. We obtain the full names of equity analysts and the research firms they were associated with from these annual volumes of Nelson's Directories and follow the procedures in Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) and Bae, Tan and Welker (2008) to match them to the analysts in the I/B/E/S database. 11 We are able to identify the country location for over 60 percent of all analysts included in the I/B/E/S database for our sample firms.
Dependent and control variables
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether analysts' cultural values are related to their forecast optimism and accuracy. Following Duru and Reeb (2002) and Herrmann, 10 Our analyses, however, do not require analysts to be raised or educated in the country in which they work. Social psychologists find that it is easy to prime subjects' independent or interdependent orientation (Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee 1999) . Analysts are constantly being "primed" with individualistic or collectivistic cues through media such as advertisement in the country that they reside in (Han and Shavitt 1994) . Consequently, they are likely to behave in similar ways to those surrounding them, even if their upbringing was in a different culture (Nisbett 2004) . 11 We obtained our broker translation file directly from I/B/E/S in September 2005. After that date, we supplement using the I/B/E/S recommendation detail file and target price file, which include analyst names and abbreviated broker IDs, but not broker full names. Where possible, we confirm broker names using the Nelson's Directory.
Hope, and Thomas (2008), we define optimism as the signed difference between the last forecast issued by an analyst within one year before the fiscal year end and the actual earnings scaled by the stock price at the previous fiscal year end. Larger values for optimism represent more optimistic forecasts. To facilitate reporting, we multiply this variable by 100. We follow Lang and Lundholm (1996), Hope (2003b) and Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) to define forecast accuracy as the price-scaled absolute difference between the last forecast issued by an analyst within one year before the fiscal year end and the actual earnings. We use the stock price at the fiscal year end in the previous year from the I/B/E/S as a scaling factor to facilitate comparison of forecast accuracy across firms. For ease of exposition, we multiply this variable by -100 so that larger values represent more accurate forecasts.
Previous studies have documented that forecast optimism and accuracy depend on forecast horizon, analysts' forecast ability, resources, and forecast complexity (Ang and Ciccone 2001, Clement 1999) . We control for the effects of these factors using various measures from the existing literature. We use analysts' general forecast experience (genex), firm-specific experience (firmex), and star status (star) to proxy for analysts' ability; the standard deviation of both stock returns (retstd) and earnings (earn_var), and the number of sectors (nsector) to proxy for forecast complexity; and brokerage size (lbrsize) and the number of analysts working for their research firms (nana) to proxy for the resources available to the analysts. We control for various other firm characteristics including leverage, loss, and market capitalization (mktcap).
We also draw on past literature to identify a wide range of variables that may differ across analyst countries including corruption, disclosure quality, investor protection, economic development, and foreign investment (see for example, Hope 2003a, Bae, Tan, and Welker 2008) .
Controlling for the effects of these country characteristics is important to assess the incremental 11 effect of cultural values on analyst forecasts after controlling for other important differences across countries. We provide estimates with and without these country characteristics to assess the impact of including these control variables on our results. The details of variables used in the study, including definition, measurement, and data source, are described in Table 1 .
Measures of economic incentives and cognitive biases
To test through which channel individualism affects analyst optimism, we follow the existing literature and employ direct measures of economic incentives and cognitive biases. The economic incentives that analysts face include generating investment banking business, increasing potential trading commissions, and currying favor with management for access to information. For investment or underwriting incentive, we use three measures in our analyses following the literature. The first is underwriting, a dummy variable that equals one if an analyst's employer served as either lead underwriter or co-manager for the covered firm in the past three years based on equity offering, and zero otherwise. Secondly, following Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006), we use deltaequity (change in equity) as a proxy for analysts' underwriting incentive. They show that deltaequity measures firms' external financing needs and is a good proxy for potential underwriting business. deltaequity is computed as sale of common and preferred stock minus purchase of common and preferred stock minus cash dividends paid, scaled by total assets. Finally, ib, our third measure of economic incentives provided by underwriting business, is a dummy variable that equals one if an analyst works for a bank with investment banking business, and zero otherwise (Dugar and Nathan 1995).
We use brk, a dummy variable that equals one if an analyst works for a brokerage house, and zero otherwise, to measure analysts' incentive to generate trading commissions through optimistic forecasts (Irvine 2004 , Jackson 2005 . We use local (a dummy variable equal to one if 12 an analyst is located in the same country as the firm covered, zero otherwise) to proxy for analysts' incentive to curry favor with management for access to private information. The survey results in Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2013) show that 65.76% of analysts believe that private communication with management is useful in determining their earnings forecasts, which ranks only second to the importance of industry knowledge (79.35%). Nearly half of the analysts responded that company/plant visits and company investor day events are very useful for generating earnings forecasts. Malloy (2005) and Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) provide evidence consistent with the information advantage of local analysts which is not available to their foreign counterparts. We thus conjecture that local analysts with ready access to the firms they cover have more incentive to establish and maintain good relationships with managers and use local as a measure of analysts' incentive to curry favor with management.
To test the cognitive-based explanation, we employ variables used in the extant literature to infer its effect because direct proxies for cognitive biases are difficult to construct using archival data. Analysts relying on representative heuristic base their forecasts on stereotypes of glamour stocks, rather than firms' underlying characteristics. Consistent with this notion, Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) find that analysts are more likely to recommend positive momentum, high growth, high volume, and relatively expensive stocks. We employ four variables used in prior studies 12 to infer the effects of representative heuristic: capital expenditure (capx), the market-to-book ratio (mb), the price-to-earnings ratio (pe), and growth in sales (sales_growth). Using representative heuristic, analysts are more optimistic and less accurate about stocks with high capx, mb, pe, and sales_growth since these characteristics are considered "representative" of glamour stocks.
12 See Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004), Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler, and Agarwal (2009) among others.
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To capture the effect of the availability heuristic, we follow existing literature to use epschg, which is the change in EPS defined as the difference between current and previous annual EPS divided by the stock price at the end of the previous year (Elgers and Lo 1994). Analysts relying on availability heuristic are likely to overweigh the information content in the most recent earnings changes and overreact to epschg (DeBondt and Thaler 1990). We therefore expect epschg to be negatively associated with forecast accuracy. We do not however, have any predictions for epschg in the optimism regression since systematic overreaction to earnings news does not necessarily lead to optimism.
Sample and descriptive statistics
Our Panel A of Table 2 shows the distribution of firms and analysts by country. The largest number of firms is in the U.S, followed by Japan, the U.K, and Canada, each having more than 1,000 firms. On average, firm size is the largest in Morocco and Russia, and the smallest in New Zealand and Pakistan. Column (3) reports the number of analysts covering firms in each country.
The U.S. and U.K. have the largest numbers of analysts covering their firms.
Column (4) In Figure 1 , we plot the 49 countries in our sample by their individualism scores from the lowest to the highest. The left vertical axis is the individualism index from Hofstede (2001) and the right vertical axis is the country-average analyst forecast optimism. The chart clearly indicates a negative relationship between individualism and forecast optimism among the countries in our sample. Untabulated reports confirm that the correlation between individualism and forecast optimism is -0.355, significant at 1%. The univariate analyses thus support a negative relationship between individualism and forecast optimism at the country level.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the distribution of firms and analysts over the years. On average, there are 6,101 analysts each year covering over 6,000 firms with 45,542 forecasts. The forecast optimism reaches the highest level in 1998 and the lowest in 2013. In unreported tests, we divide our final sample into two subsamples based on the individualism index of the country in which an analyst is located, one for countries above the median individualism and one for countries below or equal to it. Univariate tests indicate that analysts in countries with higher individualism indexes are less optimistic and more accurate than those in countries with lower individualism indexes. The mean optimism for the high-individualism countries is 0.625, significantly lower than the mean optimism of 0.906 for the low-individualism countries. The mean forecast accuracy for the high-individualism countries is -2.183, marginally significantly higher than the mean accuracy of -2.606 for the low-individualism countries. We draw similar conclusions from the median test.
Empirical analyses
In this section, we analyze the relationship between individualism and analyst forecast optimism and accuracy using OLS regressions. We control for a variety of firm, analyst, and brokerage characteristics, defined in Table 1 , which prior studies have shown to affect analyst forecast properties. We also control for time and industry effects by including forecast year and industry indicator variables. We adjust standard errors for two-way clustering at the firm and year level to correct for cross-sectional and time-series dependence in error terms. Our regression model takes the following general form:
where the dependent variable is either forecast optimism or accuracy, whereas  stands for industry based on I/B/E/S sector code and  for forecast year.
Individualism and analyst forecast optimism and accuracy
16 Table 4 shows the impact of individualism on analyst forecast optimism and accuracy.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report the estimation of the determinants of forecast optimism.
Column (1) is our benchmark model while Column (2) controls additionally for firm country characteristics that proxy for corruption, disclosure quality, investor protection, economic development and foreign investment. In both models, the coefficients of individualism are negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that individualism is negatively related to analyst forecast optimism. The coefficient of -0.007 of idv in Column (2) means that a one standard deviation increase in individualism index implies a 23% decrease in forecast optimism. 13 We therefore have strong evidence that individualism is negatively related to analyst forecast optimism. Notably, analysts' experience with the firms they cover is positively related to forecast optimism, which might be consistent with stronger incentive to curry favor with management as analysts' tenure increases. Earnings management is negatively related to optimism, possibly because earnings are managed to meet forecasts. Among country-level institutional factors, we find that country GDP per capita (lngdp) and U.S. investors' overseas holdings (ushold) are significantly positively related to analyst forecast optimism in Column (2). The negative (and significant) coefficient of corruption is expected since corruption assesses the corruption in government in each country, with higher values indicating less corruption. The coefficients of other firm country characteristics are not significant.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4 report the estimation of the determinants of forecast accuracy. The coefficient of individualism is positive and significant at the 1% level, showing that individualism is positively related to analyst forecast accuracy. An increase of one standard deviation in individualism increases the forecast accuracy by 10%, which is economically significant. Consistent with the previous literature, we find that the number of firms an analyst follows, firm size, and analyst star status are positively related to accuracy, while earnings variability, forecast horizon, leverage, loss, and return volatility are negatively related to accuracy. Brokerage size and analyst firm-specific experience also reduce forecast accuracy.
However, the coefficient of firm experience is negative and inconsistent with prior studies. In sum, Table 4 provides evidence that individualism is negatively associated with analysts' forecast optimism and is positively associated with forecast accuracy, supporting H1a but not H1b.
Economic incentives or cognitive biases?
Next we test directly whether individualism affects optimism and accuracy through economic incentives and/or cognitive biases. For the economic incentive explanation, we add measures of economic incentives (ECON) and their interactions with individualism in regression model (1):
where control includes all analyst, firm and country characteristics in Column (2) of Table 4 .
Panel A of Table 5 Table 5 show that individualism affects forecast optimism through economic incentives.
On the accuracy side, proxies for underwriting relations are negatively associated with forecast accuracy, consistent with that the incentive to generate investment banking business results in less accurate analyst forecasts; while increasing potential trading commissions (brk) is not significant in explaining forecast accuracy. The coefficient of local is positive and significant, indicating that local access to management helps improve accuracy. The coefficient of brk is insignificant for the determinants of forecast optimism and accuracy, possibly due to the little variation in this variable in our sample.
14 For the interaction terms, the coefficients of the interaction between underwriting proxies and idv are significant and positive, consistent with individualism increasing forecast accuracy by reducing analyst forecast bias associated with underwriting concerns. Individualism does not seem to have an effect on forecast accuracy through brokerage concerns or management access since the interaction between idv and brk and the interaction between idv and local are not significant in explaining accuracy. Overall, the results in Panel A of Table 5 suggest that individualism mitigates analysts' forecast optimism and correspondingly increases forecast accuracy due to their conflicts of interests with the covered firms.
We next test the cognitive bias explanation by adding indicators of cognitive biases (COG) and their interactions with individualism to our benchmark model (1):
Results are shown in Panel B of Table 5 . The variable idv remains significant and negative (positive) in explaining forecast optimism (accuracy) after we include variables to infer the effect of cognitive biases and interact them with idv. We expect capx, pe, mb, and sales_growth to be positively associated with forecast optimism if analysts rely on representativeness heuristic. In Panel B of Table 5 , however, only sales_growth has a significantly positive main effect on optimism. More importantly, the interactions between capx, pe, mb, and sales_growth and idv are either insignificant or have the wrong signs. We therefore do not find evidence that analysts in more individualistic countries are more likely to rely on representativeness heuristic and issue optimistic forecasts.
On the accuracy side, we expect the coefficients of capx, pe, mb, sales_growth, and epschg to be negative because representativeness and availability heuristics lead to analyst bias and reduce forecast accuracy. Only sales_growth is significantly negative in explaining accuracy.
The other variables do not have the expected signs. Our main focus is the coefficients of the interaction terms between cognitive biases and individualism. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the effect of individualism on forecast optimism/accuracy is more pronounced when the level of cognitive biases is higher. Therefore if individualism affects forecast optimism through cognitive 20 biases, we expect the coefficients of the interactions between cognitive bias measures and individualism to be negative. Out of the five variables, only the coefficient of the interaction term between idv and mb is significant and negative. The coefficient of mb, however, is significantly positive and opposite of the expected sign. We thus do not find evidence consistent with individualism affecting analyst forecast optimism or accuracy through cognitive biases.
Finally, we pool all of the proxies for both economic incentives and cognitive biases and their interaction terms with idv simultaneously to test the marginal effect of the two competing hypotheses in the presence of one another:
Results in Panel C of Table 5 Table 5 , but remains significantly negative after the cognitive bias measures are included in Column (2), further supporting that individualism affects analyst forecast optimism through economic incentives, rather than cognitive biases.
Culture differences and analyst forecast optimism and accuracy
We next examine the impact of culture differences on analysts' forecast optimism and accuracy. 15 To do so, we restrict our sample to foreign analysts who cover firms located outside their home country. We identify the geographic location of equity analysts based on Nelson's Directory of Investment Research from 1996 to 2008 and obtain the country locations of firm headquarters from Compustat.
We replace idv with three measures of culture difference between firm country f and analyst country a. The first measure idvdif1 fa is the absolute difference in individualism between firm country and analyst country. We use a second measure of culture difference , where I ia is the index of the ith cultural dimensions (individualism, power distance, masculinity-femininity, and uncertainty avoidance) for analyst country, I if is the cultural dimension index for firm home country, and V i is the variance of the index in the ith dimension among sample countries.
In all regressions we control for firm and analyst characteristics as well as firm country characteristics as in Column (2) of Table 4 . Table 6 shows that the culture difference between 22 analyst country and firm country is positively associated with analyst forecast optimism, and negatively associated with forecast accuracy. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 4 that analysts issue more optimistic and less accurate forecasts to firms located in countries that have more culture differences from their own countries. Since analysts strategically issue more favorable forecasts for firms with less predictable earnings in order to maintain favorable relations with managers (Duru and Reeb 2002), our findings about culture differences are consistent with the economic incentive explanation.
Robustness tests
In the above sections we have presented evidence that individualism deters forecast optimism and correspondingly improves forecast accuracy through the channel of economic incentives rather than cognitive biases. Next we conduct additional tests to ensure that our main results are robust to various changes in the sample selection and to controlling for other culture dimensions. We report results of these robustness tests in Table 7 and Table 8 and discuss them in detail below. 
Alternative samples
It is possible that analysts are influenced by the business practice of the research firms that they belong to, rather than the individual country culture in which they reside. To address this concern, we create a subsample of research firms with analysts located in at least two different countries. There are more than 250 research firms that meet this criterion. The average number of countries and firms covered by these research firms are 13 and 559, respectively. The top seven banks with the largest number of analysts are UBS, JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, ABN Amro, Credit Suisse First Boston, Citi Group, and Goldman Sachs, each with more than 600 16 In all tests in Table 7 and 8 we control for the analyst, firm and country characteristics in Column (2) of Table 4 . 23 analysts located in 15 to 35 countries. Consistent with our main findings in Table 4 and 5, results in Column (1) of Table 7 and 8 show that our findings remain unchanged for this subsample. In unreported tests, when we further restrict our sample to the Top seven banks, our results remain qualitatively unchanged. To the extent that these large research firms with international operation adopt more or less similar compensation structure while our results remain unchanged, it is unlikely that our results for the main analyses are driven by difference in the compensation structure of the research firms.
Since analyst forecast optimism and accuracy are also functions of managerial actions (i.e. a manager can manage earnings to meet a forecast), it is not clear whether our main results are an artifact of the effect of cultural values on managerial actions, including real earnings management. 17 In all of our regressions, we thus include a proxy for earnings management (earnmgmt) of the target firms attempting to control for such a mechanical link. In Table 4 we find that the coefficient of earnmgmt is significantly negative in the determinant of forecast optimism and significantly positive in that of accuracy, indicating that earnings management on the part of target firm management results in reduced analyst forecast optimism and increased forecast accuracy. To further isolate the impact of management actions on analyst forecasts, we require firms to be covered by analysts located in at least two different countries, removing the possibility that our results are driven by the individualism level of the country in which the firms are located, rather than that of the country in which the analysts are located. The results for this restricted sample are in Column (2) of Table 7 and Table 8 . We find that our main inferences remain qualitatively unchanged. To further eliminate the concern about the effect of managers' cultural values, we require an analyst to cover firms from at least two different countries in 17 We thank an anonymous referee for this insightful comment.
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Column (3) of Table 7 and 8, thus varying the cultural values of the firms that the analyst covers.
Results remain unchanged.
Column (4) in Table 7 and 8 restricts forecasts to local analysts. Results are quantitatively similar to the main results in Table 4 and 5. The results based on these alternative samples confirm that analyst forecast optimism and accuracy are affected by the individualism level of the country in which the analysts are located, rather than the culture of the firms they cover or the culture of the research firms they are affiliated with. 
Alternative cultural dimensions
We substitute our continuous measure of individualism with a dummy variable (idvdum), which takes a value of one if a forecast is by an analyst located in a country with individualism index above the sample country median, and zero otherwise. When we use this dummy variable instead of the continuous individualism measure, individualism remains significantly negatively related to analyst forecast optimism and significantly positively related to analyst forecast accuracy (See Column (5) in Table 7 ). In unreported tests, our results remain qualitatively unchanged when we replace idv with idvdum in Table 5 .
To investigate the robustness of our results regarding individualism, we include the other three cultural dimensions in the Hofstede framework in Column (6) of Table 7 : power distance (pdi, the extent to which members of society expect that power is distributed unequally), masculinity (mas, the extent to which society values competitiveness), and uncertainty avoidance (uai, a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity). Results show that these additional cultural dimensions do not take away the significance of individualism. Among the other three dimensions, only power distance is significant (and negative) in explaining analyst forecast optimism, while all the three dimensions are significantly positively related to forecast accuracy.
Country-level analyses
Column (7) in Table 7 reports the results at the analyst country level. Our main tests are conducted on the analyst-firm-year level. Country-level analyses are important in our setting since individualism is a country level variable. 19 We rerun our regressions models on the country level by taking the mean of each variable for each analyst country and year. Column (7) in Table 7 shows that individualism remains negative and significant in explaining forecast optimism and positive and significant in explaining forecast accuracy in the country level
analyses. This suggests that our controls for industry and year fixed effect and adjustment for two-way clustering at the firm (alternatively at the country) and year levels when conducting empirical analyses at the analyst-firm-year level have largely captured potential intra-correlation effects due to the within-country inflation. For our main analyses, however, we continue to conduct at analyst-firm-year level since the direct tests to distinguish the economic incentive hypothesis from the cognitive bias hypothesis could be performed more properly at such a level.
Our proxies for economic incentives and cognitive biases are analyst or firm variables, which vary among analysts/firms within the same country.
Conclusion
Our focus on the relation between cultural values and analyst forecast bias follows a growing literature that examines the impact of cultural values on corporate decision and investor trading. We examine whether cultural values affect one of the most important market participants:
financial analysts. Using a unique database that identifies analyst geographic locations 19 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this test. We also conduct direct tests on the two major competing theories for analyst forecast optimism: the economic incentive explanation and the cognitive bias explanation. Our evidence overwhelmingly supports that individualism affects analyst forecast optimism and accuracy through the economic incentives they face but not their cognitive biases. We interpret these results as meaning that since those in less individualistic (more collectivistic) cultures value group harmony more, analysts in collectivistic countries are more strongly motivated to issue optimistic forecasts either to generate investment banking business and brokerage commission fees or to please the managers of the covered firms, than their counterparts in individualistic countries.
There are limitations, however, to our study. First, while our analyses overall suggest that the effect of economic incentives dominates that of cognitive bias in analysts' earnings forecasts, we do not imply that analysts are immune to behavioral biases. Our results rely on the premise that culture value in general, and individualism in particular, maps the extent of group harmony and inner judgment. Second, although we control for a number of firm characteristics and firm country features that might correlate with earnings management and use various 27 subsamples to isolate the potential impact of management actions, we don't explicitly model the interaction between management and analyst actions. 
Dependent variables
optimism ijt Signed forecast error scaled by stock price at the previous fiscal year end from I/B/E/S. It is computed as the price scaled signed difference between the last forecast issued by analyst j within one year before the fiscal year end and the actual earnings for firm i in year t. To facilitate exposition we multiply this variable by 100. Larger values represent more optimistic forecasts.
accuracy ijt Forecast accuracy scaled by stock price at the previous fiscal year end from I/B/E/S. It is computed as the price scaled absolute difference between the last forecast issued by analyst j within one year before the fiscal year end and the actual earnings for firm i in year t. To facilitate exposition we multiply this variable by -100 so that larger values represent more accurate forecasts.
Independent variables idv a
Hofstede's (2001) cultural index of individualism for analyst country a.
idvdif1 fa
Culture difference calculated as the absolute difference between the individualism scores between firm country f and analyst country a according to Hofstede's (2001) cultural index of individualism.
idvdif2 fa
Culture difference between firm country f and analyst country a calculated as
where idv V is the variance of the index of individualism.
culdif fa
Culture difference between firm country f and analyst country a using all four dimensions in the Hofstede's (2001) framework.
where I ia is the index of the ith cultural dimension (individualism, power distance, masculinity-femininity, and uncertainty avoidance) for analyst country, I if is the cultural dimension index for firm home country, and V i is the variance of the index in the ith dimension.
idvdum a Dummy variable, which takes the value of one if a forecast is made by an analyst in a country with individualism index above the sample country median, and zero otherwise.
Economic incentives
underwriting ij Dummy variable that equals one if an analyst's employer served as either lead underwriter or co-manager for the covered firm in the past three years based on equity and debt offering from Thomson One Banker, and zero otherwise.
deltaequity ij Change in equity following Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006) . It is computed as sale of common and preferred stock minus purchase of common and preferred stock minus cash dividends paid, scaled by total assets. and previous annual EPS divided by the stock price at the previous fiscal year end.
Control variables (firm-or analyst-level)
earn_var it Standard deviation of past five years' annual earnings divided by the average earnings for firm i in year t.
earnmgmt it Earnings management level of firm i in year t, measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals from the Modified Jones Model.
firmex ijt
Analyst's firm-specific experience, defined as the time interval in years between analyst j's first forecast for a particular firm i in the I/B/E/S database and her forecast in year t for firm i.
genex jt Analyst's general experience, defined as the time interval in years between analyst j's first forecast in the I/B/E/S database and the current forecast in year t.
horizon ijt Forecast age in years between the forecast date and the corresponding I/B/E/S date of the actual earnings report.
lbrsize jt Brokerage size, defined as the natural log of the number of analysts working for the I/B/E/S brokerage with which analyst j is associated in year t.
leverage it Ratio of current liabilities to current assets for firm i in year t.
loss it Dummy variable equal to one if firm i is a loss firm in year t, zero otherwise.
mktcap it
Log of market capitalization in U.S. $ million for firm i at the end of year t.
nana it Number of analysts following firm i in year t in the I/B/E/S.
nsector jt Number of sectors analyst j covers in year t in the I/B/E/S database.
nticker jt Number of firms analyst j covers in year t in the I/B/E/S database.
retstd it
Stock return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of daily returns of firm i in year t.
star jt Dummy variable equal to one if analyst j is a star analyst in year t according to Nelson's Directory of Investment Research, zero otherwise.
Control variables (country-level)
antesd Ante private control of self-dealing. Index of ex-ante control of self-dealing transactions from Djankov et al. (2008) . Average of approval by disinterested shareholders and ex-ante disclosure.
antidir Anti-director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008) . The index ranges from 0 to 5, with higher scores representing stronger investor rights.
corruption ICR's assessment of the corruption in government from La Porta et al. (1998) . A higher value indicates less corruption. disclose Index of financial disclosure for a country. The data are from Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) .
gdp fa Ratio of firm-country's GDP to analyst-country's GDP based on data from World Development Indicators.
investor_pr Index of investor protection from Djankov et al. (2008) .
lngdp
The natural log of GDP per capita (gdp fa ). 
where optimism is the signed forecast error scaled by the most recent stock prices in the previous year from I/B/E/S. To facilitate exposition we multiply this variable by 100. Larger values for optimism represent more optimistic forecasts. accuracy is the absolute forecast error scaled by the most recent stock price in the previous year. To facilitate exposition we multiply this variable by minus 100 so that higher values represent more accurate forecasts. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Industry and year dummies are included but are not report for reporting purpose. Robust t-statistics adjusted for two-way clustering at the firm and year levels are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent: Optimism
Dependent: Accuracy where control includes all analyst, firm and country characteristics in Column (2) of Table 4 . In Panel C we pool all the ECON and/or COG variables and their interaction terms with idv simultaneously in one regression. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Industry and year dummies are included. Robust t-statistics adjusted for two-way clustering at the firm and year levels are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. TABLE 6 Culture differences and foreign analyst forecast optimism and accuracy, controlling for country-pair differences Table 6 shows the impact of international differences in cultural values on foreign analyst forecast accuracy. Foreign analysts are located in a different country from the firms they cover. The dependent variable for optimism is fe ijt and the dependent variable for accuracy is afe ijt . We proxy for culture differences using three measures. idvdif1 fa is the absolute difference in individualism scores between firm country and analyst country. where I ia is the index of the ith cultural dimensions (individualism, power distance, masculinity-femininity, and uncertainty avoidance) for analyst country, I if is the cultural dimension index for firm home country, and V i is the variance of the index in the ith dimension. We control for all analyst, firm and country characteristics in Column (2) of Table 4 . We do not report coefficients of the control variables, industry and year dummies. Robust t-statistics adjusted for two-way clustering at the firm and year levels are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
